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Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea:
The Tortured Argument of Invidious
Intent
If one factor is uniform in a continuing series of events that are
brought to pass through human intervention, the law would have to
have the blindness of indifference rather than the blindness of im-
partiality not to attribute the uniform factor to man's purpose. The
purpose may not be of evil intent or in conscious disregard of what is
conceived to be a binding duty. Prohibited conduct may result from
misconception of what duty requires.
-Justice Felix Frankfurter'
In Washington v. Davis,2 the Supreme Court identified "the basic
equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be
racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discrimina-
tory purpose."3 Troubled by the disruptive consequences of wholesale in-
1. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 293 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Cassell involved an
equal protection challenge to a Dallas County grand jury selection system that had resulted in the
virtual exclusion of blacks from grand juries. Justice Frankfurter was responding to the state's argu-
ment that its jury commissioners had been acting in good faith when they chose only whites to serve.
2. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
3. Id. at 240. The Supreme Court's route to this basic principle has been rather schizophrenic.
Compare id. at 239-41 (prior cases demonstrate longstanding use of purpose requirement) and
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960) (generally lawful acts unlawful when done to ac-
complish unlawful end) uith Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) (legislative motivation
irrelevant in equal protection cases). See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 136-40 (1980) (discussion of Court's statements about discriminatory intent);
Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Tenn-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle,
90 HARv. L. REV. 1, 26-28 (1976) (same) [hereinafter cited as Brest, Antidiscrimination Principle];
Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive,
1971 Sup. CT. REv. 95, 99-100 (same) [hereinafter cited as Brest, Legislative Motive].
This "basic principle" does not in general apply to statutory antidiscrimination actions, which in-
stead employ an effects test. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 246-47 (contrasting equal
protection intent requirement with disproportionate impact test of Title VII); Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, sec. 3, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (96 Stat.)
131, 134 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b) (establishing effects test in Voting Rights Act vote
dilution cases).
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validation of facially neutral laws,4 the Court defined discriminatory in-
tent to include only actions taken with the conscious aim of disadvantaging
protected minority groups.5 This Note examines the Court's restrictive
definition of discriminatory intent by comparing it to the concept of mens
rea in criminal law. The Note discusses how criminal and constitutional
law both employ an "intent requirement" to serve the competing goals of
moral condemnation and protection of legitimate activities. It then argues
that differences between criminal and antidiscrimination law call for a less
stringent intent standard in the latter.
The intent standard proposed by this Note expands the potential scope
of equal protection litigation. The potential conflicts between antidis-
crimination remedies and third-party interests would thus expand as well.
In its final two sections, this Note discusses how courts may use the con-
cept of the justificatory defense and their discretion in devising equitable
remedies to ensure the proper protection of third-party interests.
I. INTENT REQUIREMENTS IN CRIMINAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The similar purposes of requiring proof of intent in criminal and con-
stitutional law suggest that criminal law can provide valuable insight into
the nature of wrongful intent in constitutional law. In both fields, requir-
ing proof of intent to establish a violation allows courts to condemn offen-
sive attitudes while protecting legitimate activities. Criminal and constitu-
tional intent requirements are both sufficiently distinct frofi the law's
other uses of intent6 and sufficiently similar to one another that criminal
law provides a valuable analogue to constitutional law.'
4. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248 & n.14.
5. The Court has repeatedly confirmed the purpose requirement enunciated in Washington i.
Davis. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 69-74 (1980) (Stewart, J.); Personnel Adm'r
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274-79 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977).
6. In contract law, for example, the inquiry into state of mind revolves for the most part around
so-called "objective factors": What were the reasonable expectations of the parties under the circum-
stances? See F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 95-97, 145-46 (2d
ed. 1970). In statutory construction, the court seeks to give concrete meaning to a legislative enactment
in light of the legislature's goals. See J. ELY, supra note 3, at 4 (legislature has less opportunity to
overrule judicial judgments of constitutionality than it has to overrule undesirable statutory construc-
tion); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205,
1213-14 (1970) (legislative intent in statutory interpretation cases more easily gleaned than in consti-
tutional adjudication); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 370 (1981)
(courts' conduct more constrained in interpreting statutory or common law than in constitutional
adjudication).
7. Alexander Bickel, the only scholar to mention the analogy between criminal and constitutional
notions of intent, suggested in passing that criminal intent could be inferred from circumstantial evi-
dence of what in fact happened, while the particular effect of concern to equal protection plaintiffs
might be only a collateral result of a legislative desire to achieve some other end. See A. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 214-15 (1962).
Bickel's reservation is less apt today, both because the Supreme Court has rejected the use of such an
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A. Moral Condemnation
Unlike a tort or breach of contract, a crime or constitutional violation
frustrates more than the expectations of the parties involved in a particu-
lar case. Both criminal and constitutional law speak to a wider audience.8
Most theorists have identified moral condemnation by the community as
an essential element of traditional criminal offenses.' This moral condem-
nation surfaces most clearly in so-called victimless crimes-or "morals of-
fenses"-where prevention of involuntary injury to other parties plays a
limited role.10 The criminal "not only harms the victim, he undermines
rules and distinctions of significance beyond the specific case."1
A government's desire to injure minorities is "by [its] very nature odi-
ous to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
equality."1" The state that shirks its obligation to provide equal protection
of the law to all persons breaches faith with all those it governs."3 Paul
Brest's condemnation of "racially selective sympathy and indifference"' 4
captures this moral judgment: An action violates the Fourteenth Amend-
inference in the criminal law, see infra pp. 114-15, and because the Court's current discriminatory
intent standard does look at disparate impact.
8. See Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreu,ord: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 29 (1979) ("[C]ourts exist to give meaning to our public values, not to resolve disputes.
Constitutional adjudication is the most vivid manifestation of this function .... "); Gewirtz, Remedies
and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 587 (1983) (essence of constitutional law lies in its idealizing);
Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 401, 413 (1958) (criminal law
defines "obligations of conduct which . . . community life impose[s] upon every participating mem-
ber"); Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (1952) (crim-
inal law important for society as well as for individuals). Several commentators have pointed to the
special role of the courts in expressing this societal moral judgment. See, e.g., A. BicxEF, supra note
7, at 24-26 (judges uniquely situated to "support and maintain enduring general values"); Fiss,
supra, at 11 (open texture of critical constitutional provisions requires courts to give them meaning).
9. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 8, at 404 (criminal sanction distinguished from civil sanction by
"judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition"); Packer,
Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107, 148 ("moral blameworthiness should be
indispensible" to community condemnation of criminal sanction).
10. See H.L.A. HART, THE MORALrry OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 39 (1962) (morals offenses re-
flect idea that primary justification of criminal punishment lies in expression of condemnation of
immorality rather than in prevention of socially harmful acts); see also S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN,
CRIMINAL LAW AND rrs PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 54-55 (3d ed. 1975) (discussing litera-
ture concerning victimless crimes).
11. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability. One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1126 (1972). Criminal sanctions reflect society's belief that sim-
ply paying the victim of a crime some amount of money after injuring him cannot, by itself, discharge
the criminal's obligations, since the victim is not the only party whom the criminal wronged.
12. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (upholding curfew imposed on Japa-
nese Americans during World War II).
13. See Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J.
1287, 1296-97 (1982) (baiting minorities not only injures victim group but also "deflect[s]" and "per-
vert[s]" other public purposes).
14. Brest, Antidiscrimination Principle, supra note 3, at 7-8 ("By the phenomenon of racially
selective sympathy and indifference I mean the unconscious failure to extend to a minority the same
recognition of humanity, and hence the same sympathy and care, given as a matter of course to one's
own group.") (citation omitted).
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ment's command if it is more burdensome to some citizens only because
they possess characteristics that the Constitution forbids the legislative
process to consider."5
By imposing non-monetizable penalties such as stigma and imprison-
ment, criminal sanctions prevent the conversion of property rules into lia-
bility rules. 6 Furthermore, the criminal cannot buy his way out after the
fact by paying off a specific victim; crime is a social injury and whatever
penalty a criminal pays is paid to society as a whole. Similarly, equal
protection remedies do not allow the state to continue violating victims'
rights by providing monetary compensation;" indeed, because constitu-
tional violations affect society as a whole, such compensation would be
impossible. Instead, equitable remedies enjoin unconstitutional practices
and order relief to restore victims to the positions they would have occu-
pied absent any discrimination."'
Criminal and constitutional law recognize that certain rights are so es-
sential to our society that they cannot be relinquished by those entitled to
them or be acquired by other parties.1 ' The importance of these rights,
reflected in the decision to regard them as inalienable, explains why at-
tempting to deny them is so morally blameworthy.
B. Protection of Legitimate Activity
If condemnation of morally offensive attitudes were the sole concern of
either criminal or constitutional inquiries into defendants' states of mind,
15. See J. ELY, supra note 3, at 157; Brest, Antidiscrimination Principle, supra note 3, at 5-8;
Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 953, 964 (1978); Schnapper, Two Categories of Discriminatory Intent, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 31, 46-47 (1982).
16. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 11, at 1126. In general, rights are protected by a
combination of property and liability rules. Property rules require that someone who wishes to ac-
quire a protected right negotiate a voluntary transfer with its owner. Id. at 1092. Liability rules allow
involuntary transfers but require that the acquiring party compensate the owner of the rights with an
amount determined by the court. Id. at 1092, 1106-07.
17. But see Gewirtz, supra note 8, at 614 n.77 (discussing delayed remedies in structural antidis-
crimination suits); id. at 663-64 (discussing desegregation decrees which order "educational compo-
nents" in lieu of eliminating all one-race schools).
18. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1977); Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402
U.S. 33, 37 (1971).
19. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 11, at 1111-15; cf. The Declaration of Independence para.
1 (U.S. 1776) ("Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness" are "unalienable Rights").
The decision to make rights inalienable reflects two determinations. First, it is self-paternalistic
when, as with the Bill of Rights, society has decided that it will be better off in the long run if it
denies itself the right to act in certain ways because the rights it denies to some today may be denied
to others tomorrow. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 11, at 1113. This notion dovetails with
Ely's theory of the Fourteenth Amendment's expression of a right to virtual representation, see infra
pp. 123-24. Second, the decision may reflect a desire to honor the preferences of those not directly
involved: Even if, for example, some blacks would be satisfied with a tax reduction in exchange for
attending inferior, segregated schools, we may feel as a community that such a transaction, voluntary
though it may be, violates our fundamental political and ethical norms. See Calabresi & Melamed,
supra note 11, at 1112.
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courts might well establish a presumption that whenever a defendant was
the cause in fact of a criminal or constitutional wrong, he had wrongful
intent. In the past decade, however, the Supreme Court has rejected such
a presumption in both criminal2" and equal protection cases.21
The imposition of harsh sanctions normally deters criminal behavior.2
In order to ensure that the law does not prevent wrongful conduct at the
expense of interfering with legitimate behavior, the prosecution must
demonstrate a nexus between the defendant's state of mind and the partic-
ular wrong that the law prohibits.2"
In constitutional law, requiring plaintiffs to prove intent protects legis-
lative autonomy. Democratic theory accords substantial weight toa repre-
sentative legislature's decisions about the aims a government ought to pur-
sue and the means by which those aims ought to be reached.2 ' The equal
protection clause allows courts to step in to overturn the legislature's bal-
ancing of various groups' interests only when that weighing has been
tainted by constitutionally forbidden considerations.2"
20. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517, 520-24 (1979) (jury instruction that law
presumes that person intends ordinary consequences of voluntary acts violates due process require-
ment that state prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to conviction).
21. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (proof of discriminatory intent requires
showing that defendant "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because
of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group").
22. See Packer, supra note 9, at 126 ("[R]equiring a man to act at his peril is likely to inhibit his
engaging in the activity in question. Where that activity is constitutionally protected, .. the imposi-
tion of strict liability is an unreasonable restraint on his freedom to act.").
23. When the prosecution demonstrates that nexus, it shows that the defendant was acting pur-
posefully with respect to the wrong prohibited by the applicable statute. If the state may properly
prohibit that wrong, then purposeful action taken in order to cause that result is blameworthy. See
izfra note 62.
24. See A. BICKEL, supra note 7, at 19 ("policy-making power of representative institutions" is
touchstone of American political system); Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 3, at 127-28 (legisla-
ture is proper body to decide "goodness" of policy); Fiss, supra note 8, at 6 ("general presumption in
favor of majoritarianism").
25. The famous Carolene Products footnote four first suggested that the normal presumption of
constitutionality may not operate in cases involving certain distinctions: "[Pirejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938). For recent judicial applications of this theory, see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 371-72 (1971) (resident aliens constitute discrete and insular minority requiring heightened judi-
cial protection); Sterling v. Harris, 478 F. Supp. 1046, 1051-52 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (applying Carolene
Products analysis to the mentally ill), rev'd on other grounds sub non. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S.
221 (1981).
Carolene Products both serves as the basis for modem procedural fairness theories of the Four-
teenth Amendment and suggests their limits. Ely, for example, argues that the Constitution is
designed to assure the right of political participation. To make that right meaningful, the polity must
be restrained from acting on the basis of animus. Thus, when effective political participation is denied
to minorities, courts ought to step in; courts should not assume, however, that every time minority
interests lose out in the political process that such a result is unjustifiable. See J. ELY, supra note 3, at
73-179. For judicial expressions of this limit on judicial intervention, see Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) ("calculus of effects" is legislative, not judicial task); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (presumption that balancing
function belongs to legislatures or administrators unless they act arbitrarily or irrationally).
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Moreover, demonstrating a nexus between the statutory or constitu-
tional harm and the defendant's state of mind does not by itself override
concerns for protecting legitimate activity or justify the moral condemna-
tion that follows a judgment of criminality or unconstitutionality. Courts
must also decide whether a defendant's deviation from the usual standard
is justified by an end of greater importance than that served by obedience
to criminal or constitutional law." Thus, consideration of intent operates
to mediate the tension between condemnation and protection.
II. THE EFFECT ON THE INTENT STANDARD OF DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN CRIMINAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The differences between criminal and constitutional law suggest that
the intent requirement in equal protection cases should be less stringent
than that employed in criminal prosecutions.
A. The Role of the Victim
Most criminal statutes ignore the victims' personal characteristics, ex-
cept for the fact that they were injured by the activity that the statute
forbids.27 Antidiscrimination law, however, manifests special concern for
certain groups through the use of heightened scrutiny to analyze particu-
lar distinctions.2" This difference suggests that we should employ a less
stringent intent requirement in equal protection cases. Furthermore, crim-
inal law does not attempt to restore victims to the position they occupied
26. See infra pp. 128-29 (discussion of justification in criminal and constitutional law).
27. Cases like United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975) (prosecution under federal statute
prohibiting attacks on federal officers), should perhaps be understood as specifying the status of the
victim as a jurisdictional matter. There are also a few laws that specify the victim class in order to
provide it with special protection. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)
(California statutory rape law meant to protect underage girls from unwanted pregnancies); Dersho-
witz, The Special Victim is Not New in the Law, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1977, § 4, at 6, col. 3.
28. Normally, the state may justify a regulation that singles out and disadvantages a particular
group by showing that the regulation is rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate state
interest. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-89 (1955) (upholding restriction on opti-
cians' prescribing power). Rational relation scrutiny, as the normal level of review is termed, almost
never results in invalidation. Thus, judicial review affords little protection to most groups that lose out
in the political process. If a regulation singles out and disadvantages a suspect class such as a racial
minority, however, the state must show that its act is necessarily related to the achievement of a
compelling governmental interest. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). Strict scrutiny,
as this form of review is termed, virtually always results in the invalidation of a challenged law. See
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Tern-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Chang-
ing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). An "intermediate"
level of scrutiny is applied to gender-based distinctions. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)
(measure upheld if substantially related to achievement of important governmental interest). Interme-
diate scrutiny reflects somewhat greater concern for the rights of women than is accorded to the
interests of opticians, but decidedly less solicitude than is extended to racial minorities. See Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
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before the commission of the crime; rather, it leaves such attempts to civil
tort actions 29 or victim compensation statutes.30 The central concern of
equal protection law is remediation for victims; 1 any burden laid on
equal protection defendants is incidental.
B. The Burden of Proof
The different burdens of proof faced by criminal prosecutors and equal
protection plaintiffs also suggest that the intent requirement in constitu-
tional cases should be less stringent than that employed in criminal trials.
The Constitution requires that the government prove all necessary ele-
ments of a crime-including mens rea-beyond a reasonable doubt.32 In
civil cases, including equal protection challenges, a plaintiff need usually
prove the necessary elements of her case only by a preponderance of the
evidence. 3 The higher standard required by the criminal law reflects soci-
ety's desire not to deprive a defendant of his liberty or subject him to
community opprobrium without extremely reliable proof of guilt; it also
reflects a desire to protect the individual against the litigational advan-
tages the state enjoys in prosecuting him." In addition, proving mens rea
beyond a reasonable doubt does not lighten the prosecutor's burden in
proving the other elements of the offense.3
Equal protection litigation does not impose this stringent burden of
proof on plaintiffs. In fact, a mere showing of discriminatory intent effec-
tively shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant.3 Thus, it should
29. See Beach, Getting Status and Getting Even, TIME, Feb. 7, 1983, at 40 (discussing damage
suits by crime victims); Press, Giving Victims a Say in Court, NEwswEEK, Mar. 14, 1983, at 51
(discussing both damage suits and victim intervention in criminal proceedings).
30. See, e.g., N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 620-35 (McKinney 1982) (establishing Crime Victims Com-
pensation Board to provide financial assistance to crime victims); Crime Victims Compensation Act,
ILL REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 71 (1981) (giving victims right of action in state Court of Claims).
31. The purpose of the injunctive decree entered in an equal protection case is to "restore the
victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such
conduct." Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974).
32. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); see also Underwood, The Thumb on the
Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1306-08 (1977)
(discussion of purposes and scope of reasonable doubt requirement).
33. See Underwood, supra note 32, at 1300-01; cf. Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (employing preponderance of the evidence test in First
Amendment discriminatory intent case); Simon v. Honeywell, Inc., 642 F.2d 754, 755 (5th Cir. 1981)
(use of preponderance of the evidence standard in Title VII antidiscrimination actions).
34. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69
YALE L.J. 1149, 1150 (1960) (state enjoys greater prestige and resources than most defendants);
Underwood, supra note 32, at 1306-07 (same).
35. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged.") (emphasis added).
36. Once a plaintiff has proved discriminatory intent by a preponderance of the evidence, the state
must rebut the presumption that the law is solely an expression of constitutionally impermissible
motivation. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270
n.21 (1977); Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977).
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be more difficult to establish the elements of a criminal offense than of a
constitutional violation. Currently, however, equal protection law requires
that plaintiffs always prove specific "purpose" to win,3 7 while criminal
mens rea can be established in certain cases by showing purpose, knowl-
edge, recklessness, or negligence."
C. The Interests of Third Parties
In general, punishing a convict is unlikely to have significant harmful
effects on third parties.39 The effect his punishment does have on third
parties will consist in large part of desirable general deterrence: The fate
of the defendant will dissuade others from acting as he did.40
In equal protection cases, by contrast, the defendant is usually a gov-
37. See infra pp. 122-23.
38. See infra p. 121.
There is another interesting difference between criminal and constitutional litigation: The Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments afford defendants in criminal cases the right to insist that a jury decide
whether their states of mind are sufficiently culpable to justify community condemnation. See U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury. . . ."); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 156 (1968) (right
to jury trial fundamental because of system's "insistence upon community participation in the deter-
mination of guilt or innocence," and therefore required in state criminal proceedings). In equal pro-
tection cases, by contrast, defendants do not possess the right to trial b jury because the Seventh
Amendment's guarantee that "in Suits at common law, . . . the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served," U.S. CONST. amend. VII, does not apply to equity actions. United States v. Louisiana, 339
U.S. 699, 706 (1950). Actions based on § 1983 thus do not fall within the amendment's ambit. Mc-
Ferren v. County Bd. of Educ., 455 F.2d 199, 202-04 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nora. County Bd. of
Educ. v. Walker, 407 U.S. 934 (1972); see also Comment, The Seventh Amendment and Civil Rights
Statutes: History Adrift in a Maelstrom, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 503 (1973) (applicability of amendment's
guarantee to various antidiscrimination proceedings).
The reason for this difference is not hard to fathom and has little bearing on the nature of intent.
In equal protection cases, the application of community standards would contradict the assumption
that the plaintiffs were denied equal protection precisely because their interests or status were not
those of the community from which a jury would be drawn. See Lawton v. Nightingale, 345 F. Supp.
683, 684 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (in § 1983 action, right to jury trial makes no sense because someone
"seeking to vindicate an unpopular right could never succeed before a jury drawn from a populace
mainly opposed to his views").
This difference concerns only the trier of fact, and not the fact the trier is to ascertain. Moreover,
this procedural difference suggests that the law has greater solicitude for the rights of criminal defen-
dants, since juries possess mechanisms for leniency, such as nullification, that are unavailable to
judges. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 529-30 (1975) (juries serve political function in
guarding against prosecutorial abuse); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130-37 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (purposes underlying jury's ability to nullify).
39. This does not ignore the possibility that there may be heavy social costs-for example, prison
construction expenses or public assistance for families of prisoners-attached to some forms of crimi-
nal punishment. One would presume, however, that the legislature considers these costs when enact-
ing the statute. In any case, the judge is not expected to exercise equitable discretion in his treatment
of an offender because of costs to third parties.
40. See S. KADISH & M. PAuLsEN, supra note 10, at 26-40 (discussing theories of general and
specific deterrence); Hart, supra note 8, at 408-09 (same).
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ernmental entity, and a sizeable class of individuals has been injured.41 A
plaintiff's victory will therefore affect the entire community.42 In a school
desegregation case, for example, the integration decree often involves not
only significant busing of pupils who were neither plaintiffs nor defen-
dants, but also substantial expenditures on new facilities and educational
programs. 4" The burdens placed on innocent third parties therefore should
cause courts to be more restrained in fashioning antidiscrimination reme-
dies than they are in sentencing criminals.44
D. The Problem of Group Intent
Few areas of criminal law have occasioned more controversy than the
treatment of group crimes and group intent.'5 Criticism of prosecutions
for group crimes generally focuses on the injustice of subjecting an indi-
vidual to harsh criminal sanctions because of a group action for which he
might not be responsible. 4" Nonetheless, criminal law punishes group
crime by prosecuting the individuals involved.
There is virtually no question that the harms which the law seeks to
prevent fall within the purview of the government's prohibitory power.' 7
41. In school segregation cases, for example, the plaintiff class is often defined as all black chil-
dren who are or will be students in the defendant school system. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Board of
School Directors, 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980); Brown v. Board of Educ., 84 F.R.D. 383, 394 (D.
Kans. 1979). Prison reform litigation also often involves large classes with ever-changing memberships
challenging institutional practices. See Powell v. Ward, 487 F. Supp. 917, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (class
includes future as well as current prisoners), modified, 643 F.2d 924 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
837 (1981). For a discussion of the peculiar nature of structural litigation, see generally Chayes, The
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976); Fiss, supra note 8;
Gewirtz, supra note 8.
42. "To undo the effects of the wrongs in the direct manner that the injunction contemplates,.
the court must consider rearranging many pieces that were irrelevant to the question of violation."
Gewirtz, supra note 8, at 604; see Brest, Antidiscrimination Principle, supra note 3, at 36 (controver-
sial nature of antidiscrimination remedies stems from effects on third parties).
43. Gewirtz, supra note 8, at 633.
44. See infra pp. 131-34 (use of equitable discretion to take into account third party interests).
45. The issue has figured most prominently in the context of corporate crime and criminal con-
spiracy. See generally Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARe. L. REv. 1227 (1979) (examination of recent upsurge in
efforts to regulate corporate activity through criminal proceedings) [hereinafter cited as Corporate
Crime]; Note, The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime or Protection of Individual
Defendants, 62 HARv. L. REV. 276 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Note, Conspiracy Dilemma].
46. See Duke, Conspiracy, Complicity, Corporations, and Federal Code Reform, in CRIMINAL
LAW AND THE CORPORATE COUNSE.L 147, 149 (A. Abramovsky ed. 1981) (difficulty lies in holding
people responsible for what other actors did, not in holding them responsible for acts they themselves
performed); Corporate Crime, supra note 45, at 1230 ("problematic" nature of corporate crime stems
from prosecution of individuals within company); cf. Packer, supra note 9, at 116-18 (In discussing
troublesomeness of United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (president of drug company
held criminally liable for shipping adulterated drugs), Packer notes that "if no one committed a crime,
there was no crime for which Dotterweich could have been held vicariously liable.").
47. This is obviously true when a corporation performs an act which would be criminal if it were
performed by an individual. See Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime,
85 YALE L.J. 1091, 1093 (1976). Similarly, conspiracies to commit acts which the criminal law pro-
hibits involve outcomes the state is empowered to prevent.
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Group crimes are often more dangerous than individual criminal activity
because they involve "the strength, opportunities and resources of many
[actors]," rather than those of only one.4 Furthermore, individuals are
often more likely to act criminally when part of a group, since they substi-
tute the group's moral scheme for society's moral strictures.49
The criticism leveled at prosecution of group crime is largely inapposite
to antidiscrimination law, even though the intention of some group,
whether a school board or a legislature, is at issue in almost every equal
protection case. First, by its very terms, the equal protection clause con-
templates "group offenses"; only the government, and not individuals, can
violate it.50 Second, liability in an antidiscrimination case places no bur-
den on the individual legislators who collectively violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1 Thus, the fairness question does not loom so large in con-
stitutional law.
Just as in criminal law "the number and the compact give weight and
cause danger," 52 a defendant government's use of state power makes un-
constitutional discrimination possible on a scale inaccessible to private
parties acting alone. Furthermore, the state, by passing a law with the
intention of violating the equal protection clause, is attempting to substi-
tute its judgment for that contained in the Constitution.
There are, of course, obvious practical and philosophical difficulties in
ascertaining legislative intent,53 but the courts have long employed a ficti-
tious construct in judicial review." Whatever the problems, the Supreme
48. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); see, e.g.,
Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961); Marcus, Federal Conspiracy and Complicity
Statutes-Panel Discussion, in CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CORPORATE COUNSEL, supra note 46, at
181, 181-82.
49. See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. at 594; Goldstein, On the Function of Criminal Law
in Riot Control, in CRIME, LAW, AND SocimT 343, 352-56 (A. Goldstein & J. Goldstein eds. 1971).
50. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-13 (1883) (Fourteenth Amendment meant only to
reach state action).
51. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 1, provides federal legislators with absolute immunity concerning
the performance of their legislative duties. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S.
491, 501-03, 508 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 311-13 (1973). Although this protection
does not extend to state officials, United States v. DiCarlo, 565 F.2d 802, 805 (1st Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978), common law immunity has been conferred on state officials when they
act in a legislative capacity. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-79 (1951) (state legislators are
immune from suit under 8 U.S.C. § 43 [current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)1); see Bruce v.
Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 279 (4th Cir. 1980) (absolute immunity from § 1983 suits for any official
acting in "legislative" capacity). Any financial or organizational burden imposed by the courts will be
passed along to the constituency. See supra pp. 118-19.
52. Marcus, supra note 48, at 182 (quoting nineteenth-century House of Lords discussion of Irish
nationalist plot).
53. See Ely, supra note 6, at 1212-17 (discussing difficulty with discerning legislative motivation
and problems with using motivation to invalidate otherwise valid laws); Note, Reading the Mind of
the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317, 322
n.9 (1976) (problems with discovering institutional intent).
54. See Dworkin, .The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469, 477 (1981) ("[T]here is no
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Court has repeatedly required courts to undertake such a determination in
equal protection cases."
III. MENS REA AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL INTENT STANDARD
Depending upon the offense, a judge or jury can find criminal culpabil-
ity when defendants act with a variety of intentions. The similarities be-
tween criminal and constitutional law suggest that the Supreme Court
should not restrict its definition of discriminatory intent to "purpose"
alone.
A. The Graded Spectrum of Intent in Criminal Law
Several analytically distinct levels of intent can satisfy the mens rea re-
quirement.56 The Model Penal Code57 recognizes four: purpose; 5 knowl-
edge;59 recklessness;6 0 and negligence."' All involve attitudes which are
morally offensive to the community. 2
such thing as the intention of the Framers waiting to be discovered, even in principle. There is only
some such thing waiting to be invented.").
55. See supra note 5.
56. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952) (discussing "variety, disparity, and
confusion" of traditional definitions of mens rea); see generally Robinson, A Brief History of Distinc-
lions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HASnNGs L.J. 815 (1980) (development of spectrum of mens rea).
57. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (purpose of Model
Penal Code is to "rationalize" common law mens rea). The Supreme Court has recently employed the
Model Penal Code's scheme in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,
403-05 (1980) (prison escape); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444-45
(1978) (antitrust prosecution); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 613 (1971) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (Firearms Act violation).
58. A person acts purposely with respect to an element of an offense if "it is his conscious object
to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result .... MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(2)(a)(i) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
59. A person acts knowingly if "he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will
cause [the forbidden] result." Id. § 2.02(2)(b)(ii).
60. A person acts recklessly when he "consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk"
that his conduct will cause the result the law seeks to prevent. Id. § 2.02(2)(c). "The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that
a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation," id., although "even substantial risks may
be created without recklessness when the actor seeks to serve a proper purpose," id. § 2.02 comment 3
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
61. A person acts negligently when he should have been aware of a "substantial and unjustifiable
risk" that his actions would cause the result that the law forbids. Id. § 2.02(2)(d) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962). Negligence thus involves "constructive" foreseeability of the risk involved.
62. The intolerability of purposeful action is dear. If the criminal law "defines the minimum
conditions of man's responsibility to his fellows," Hart, supra note 8, at 410, then a person who
deliberately flouts these obligations surely deserves the community's condemnation.
There are some circumstances in which only a showing of purpose will suffice. See, e.g., United
States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980) (inchoate crimes); Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631,
641 (1947) (treason). The law generally finds knowledge culpable, however, since by forbidding acts
with a certain result, the law has already decided that no one should do them. See, e.g., Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 525-26 (1979) (homicide); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438
U.S. 422, 444-45 (1978) (criminal price-fixing).
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B. The Purpose Requirement in Antidiscrimination Law
The discriminatory intent standard developed by the Supreme Court in
the wake of Washington v. Davis6" prohibits a finding of animus without
proof of the most serious state of mind-purpose.64 Personnel Administra-
tor of Massachusetts v. Feeney"5 requires that a plaintiff prove that the
challenged action was taken because it would injure a protected group."
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Cor-
poration67 demands proof that but for the conscious aim of disadvantaging
minorities, the legislature would not have enacted the offending law."6
In practice, no state of mind other than purpose can meet such an in-
tent requirement, since knowledge, recklessness, and negligence all by def-
inition describe mental states in which the government is pursuing an ad-
ditional, legitimate goal." By articulating such a goal-and courts often
A reckless defendant did not actually know that his acts would cause the prohibited harm, but he
was aware of the risk that such a result would ensue. The reckless person overweighs his own inter-
ests-the purpose of his acts-at the expense of abdicating his responsibilities to his fellows. See
Wechsler, Symposium on the Model Penal Code: Foreword, 63 COLUM. L. Rav. 589, 592 (1963);
Wechsler, Ont Culpability and Crime: The Treatment of Mens Rea in the Model Penal Code, 339
ANNALS 24, 31 (1962).
Unlike the blameworthiness attending the other three states of mind, "the culpability of negligence
is not the culpability of choice, but rather of failing to bring to bear one's faculties to perceive the risks
that one is taking." Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis, 119 U.
PA. L. REv. 401, 415 (1971). The decision to impose culpability for negligent behavior often reflects
one of two perceptions: either the harm the law seeks to prevent is especially serious, as it is in
homicide; or the defendant occupies a status which imposes upon him a duty of care which ignoraAce
should not excuse him from fulfilling. See Hart, supra note 8, at 421 (discussing culpability of negli-
gence); Packer, supra note 9, at 131 (same). A number of cases in which the Supreme Court has
upheld criminal liability based on negligent behavior have involved corporate (that is, group) criminal
activity. Id. See also supra pp. 119-20 (discussion of group crime).
63. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
64. 426 U.S. at 240.
65. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
66. "'Discriminatory purpose' . . . implies that the decisionmakers . . . selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon
an identifiable group." Id. at 279. For applications of this standard, see, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 323 n.26 (1980) (upholding Hyde Amendment restriction on abortion against claim of
foreseeable discrimination against teenage women); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d
1239, 1245 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing right of school board to use neigh-
borhood assignment plan with foreseeable segregatory consequences).
67. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
68. Although proof that discriminatory intent was "a motivating factor in the decision" removes
the normal judicial presumption of deference to legislative balancing, id. at 265-66 (emphasis added),
the defendant still can save its action by showing that "the same decision would have resulted even
had the impermissible purpose not been considered." Id. at 270 n.21. For applications of this stan-
dard, see East Texas Motor Freight Co. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403-04 & n.7 (1977) (Title VII
case); Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 64 (2d Cir. 1978) (deprivation of medicaid benefits to Chris-
tian Scientist).
69. The Model Penal Code's formulations of knowledge, recklessness, and negligence all expressly
recognize that actors with these intents are pursuing some purpose other than causing the result that
the law forbids. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); see supra notes
61-62.
The nonpurposiveness of many legislative acts which disproportionately burden minorities inheres
in the legislative process. The legislature is almost always pursuing more than one end when it acts.
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make a strenuous effort to find one7 -- a defendant will be able to show
that it acted in spite of, and not because of, the risk of injuring minorities.
C. The Indefensibility of a Purpose Requirement in Equal Protection
Cases
The Supreme Court's condemnation of only purposeful discrimination
is rooted in its incorrect balancing of the two goals of the intent require-
ment. Washington v. Davis1 expressed the Court's desire to avoid the
"parade of horribles" that would accompany a disparate impact test."' An
intent requirement less strict than purpose, however, would better balance
these concerns.
1. Knowledge, Recklessness, and Negligence in Constitutional Law
Because of the Constitution's and the courts' special concern for the
protection of certain groups from defects in the political process,7 3 the
middle ground occupied by knowledge, recklessness, and negligence 4 need
not consist of three analytically distinct states of mind in constitutional
law. Unlike the relationship of a criminal to his victim, the legislature has
a special responsibility to its constituency; under one formulation, the
See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); A.
BICKEL, supra note 7, at 214. In addition, the purpose of the legislature is often simply to give effect
to the voice of its constituents. See infra pp. 125-26 (recklessness and negligence of legislative acts can
consist of giving effect to private discrimination).
70. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 494-96 & nn.9-10 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (Court's decision justifying gender-based California statutory rape law as related to
state aim of preventing teenage pregnancy was without evidence that prevention of pregnancy moti-
vated passage of law); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949) (upholding
truck advertising ban as possibly related to safety considerations); see also J. ELY, supra note 3, at
125 (court will invoke any possible permissible goal to save statute even if no agent of defendant has
ever suggested it); Calabresi, Retroactivity: Paramount Powers and Contractual Changes, 71 YALE
L.J. 1191, 1199 n.27 (1962) (noting "diligence" of courts' searches for acceptable rationale for chal-
lenged policies). Of course, "that a legislature seeks to advantage one group does not, as a matter of
logic or of common sense, exclude the possibility that it also intends to disadvantage another." Person-
nel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 282 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The current but for gloss
placed on the intent requirement, however, makes it fairly certain that neither logic nor common sense
will substantially affect the determination of intent.
71. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
72. 426 U.S. at 248 & n.14; see Brest, Antidiscrimination Principle, supra note 3, at 29 (because
current effects of historical discrimination are so pervasive, effects test would result in wholesale inval-
idation of current laws); cf. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 20 (when judges began to realize ramifications of
expansive notion of due process clause, scope of clause was narrowed).
73. See supra p. 116.
74. See Packer, supra note 9, at 109-10 (criminal negligence as "half-way house" between tradi-
tional notions of intent and strict liability); cf. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S.
422 (1978) (criminal antitrust liability cannot be established by anticompetitive effects alone, but
knowledge will satisfy intent requirement). The Model Penal Code views knowledge, negligence, and
recklessness as occupying such a middle ground. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §§
2.02(2)(b)-2.02(2)(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (defining culpable states of mind) with id. §
2.05 (provision dealing with strict liability offenses).
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equal protection clause imposes a duty of "virtual representation" upon
the legislature, an obligation that it consider the interests of all those
whom its actions will affect.7 '5 There is a potential conflict between the
legislature's duty to be responsive to its constituency's desires (sometimes
bigoted), and its duty of allegiance to the Constitution. The Fourteenth
Amendment's special concern for minorities, 6 however, requires that a
legislature consider the rights of these groups'when it makes its "calculus
of effects." A legislature should be charged with either actual or construc-
tive knowledge of potential burdens its acts will impose on minorities."7
2. The Moral Culpability of All Intentional Discrimination
The special constitutional concern for minorities that blurs the lines be-
tween knowledge, recklessness, and negligence also provides the basis for
finding morally culpable intent when a plaintiff proves any of these states
of mind.
The current intent standard, by focusing exclusively on the ultimate
purpose of the state's action, insulates "means discrimination"7 8 from ef-
fective review. Because virtually any legislative decision can be described
as furthering some "umbrella goal," such as promotion of the general wel-
fare,7 9 most discriminatory conduct is not "purposeful," at least not in the
sense that the legislature consciously wanted to burden minorities. Rather,
it reflects the willingness of the state, in pursuit of a nondiscriminatory
goal, to place disproportionate burdens on those groups who are least able
to bear them and least able to complain effectively.80
Given the cumulative and pervasive nature of past purposeful discrimi-
nation against blacks and women, courts should presume that legislatures
75. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 86 (Fourteenth Amendment "quite plainly imposes a judicially en-
forceable duty of virtual representation."); cf J. MASHAw & R. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 816 (1975) (discussing effect on standing
doctrine in administrative law cases of government's obligation extending to all citizens).
76. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1872) ("[T]he one pervading pur-
pose . . . lying at the foundation of [the Fourteenth Amendment was] . . . the security and firm
establishment of [the ex-slaves'] freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen
from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him."); see Brest,
Legislative Motive, supra note 3, at 108-09 (development of suspect classifications dependent on
courts' sentiment that certain groups are often victimized by prejudice); Simon, Racially Prejudiced
Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimina-
tion, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1041, 1051, 1068-69 (1978) (function and significance of suspect classes
derives from history of systematic discrimination against them).
77. Actual knowledge would correspond to either knowledge or recklessness, depending on how
certain the legislature was that its act would adversely affect blacks or women, while constructive
knowledge would parallel the culpable ignorance inherent in criminal negligence.
78. Schnapper, supra note 15, at 32 ("means discrimination" refers to invidious consideration of
race in selecting method used to achieve a previously selected objective).
79. See Ely, supra note 6, at 1246-47.
80. See supra p. 115-16 (rationale for special constitutional protection is certain groups' helpless-
ness in political arena).
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know that some facially neutral laws or regulations will have "devastat-
ing" impacts upon minority opportunities.81 Acting in the face of such
knowledge" "serve[s] only to perpetuate these [past] inequities in a differ-
ent form." 8 The state's willingness to let the burden continually fall on
the same discrete and insular groups reflects morally offensive
indifference.8'
Culpable, nonpurposeful state discrimination might also resemble reck-
lessness or negligence. In a democracy, the purpose of state action is often
to satisfy the majority's demands.85 Unfortunately, a majority may de-
mand the exclusion of blacks or women. The current intent standard,
which looks at the attitude of the state officials responsible for the chal-
lenged policy, rather than at the expressed motives of individual citizens, 6
means the state can "effectively abdicate its responsibilities by either ig-
noring them or by merely failing to discharge them whatever the motive
may be."'87 The equal protection clause becomes little more than "a sterile
promise [when] state involvement in possible private [discriminatory] ac-
tivity [can] be shielded altogether from constitutional scrutiny [by claiming
that the state's intent is simply to satisfy the citizenry.]"88 When the state
indulges the discriminatory tastes of individual citizens, it "commit[s] the
81. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1979) (district court found, and Su-
preme Court accepted, that Massachusetts' preference law had foreseeable, devastating impact on
women's employment prospects).
82. This seems to be the gloss put on "in spite of" by the Court. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278-79
(although claim that effects of veterans' preference were unintended was "disingenuous" and "[could
not] seriously be argued," court refused to find discriminatory purpose); cf. Note, Absolute Veterans'
Preference in Public Employment: Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 21 B.C.L.
REV. 1110, 1140 (1980) (suggesting "in spite of" should not mean regardless of, but instead should
reflect unbiased legislative balancing).
83. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 297 (1969) (in Voting Rights Act case, court
voided literacy test because defendant's longstanding intentional discrimination in education rendered
blacks less able to pass test); see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (Title VII case
noting role of inferior segregated schools in blacks' poor performance on employer's test); cf. Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 n.9 (1979) (striking down Alabama alimony statute because it relied on past
discrimination to justify current gender-based distinction). The present intent standard rejects such a
"reliance" argument. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 276-77 (Massachusetts' act does not "incorporate"
intentional federal discrimination against women in the armed forces).
84. See supra pp. 113-14.
85. This presumption underlies the normal deference accorded to legislative determinations. See
supra p. 115.
86. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 114 & n.23 (1981) (even when officials acted upon
citizens' request, relevant intent was that of city council, not that of petitioning citizens).
87. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (pre-Washington v. Davis
decision striking down exclusion of blacks from restaurant in building owned by defendant, a state
agency).
88. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 466-67 (1973) (striking down Mississippi textbook pro-
gram providing books to segregated private schools). This sentiment seems to underlie "state action"
cases, in which plaintiffs challenge legislative or administrative acts that give support or status to
private discriminatory action which would not otherwise fall within the Fourteenth Amendment's
prohibition. See generally G. GuNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW
985-99, 1002-07, 1011-15, 1020-21, 1026-28 (10th ed. 1980) (discussion of state action cases).
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constitutional accounting error of treating the infringement of a constitu-
tional right as a benefit rather than as a cost.""9 This misperception of
costs and benefits is precisely the necessary predicate of recklessness or
negligence: Both states of mind describe actions that were unjustified in
light of the risks they created.90
3. A Broader Intent Standard is Superior to an Effects Test
Many critics of the current purpose requirement propose replacing it
with an effects test. An effects test examines the impact of a challenged
act: If the act disproportionately injures a protected group, then the defen-
dant's "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
[it].""1 This Note's proposal to expand the definition of "discriminatory
intent" to include knowledge, recklessness, and negligence would better
serve the Constitution's twin goals of condemning socially offensive atti-
tudes and protecting legitimate activity.
An effects test does not involve making the moral judgment about a
state's good faith which an intent test requires.92 The failure of a state to
treat its citizens equally violates a central constitutional, principle, how-
ever;98 such dereliction ought to be condemned, and not simply invalidated
as reflecting an unwise policy. Moreover, the choice of which groups to
protect with an effects test must stem ultimately from our desire to remedy
89. Brest, Reflections on Motive Review, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1141, 1144 (1978).
The Court's current atomistic perspective renders recklessness or negligence virtually impossible to
prove. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980) (Stewart, J.):
[Plast discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn governmental action that
is not itself unlawful. The ultimate question remains whether a discriminatory intent has been
proved in a given case. More distant instances of official discrimination in other cases are of
limited help in resolving that question.
Sinct there is no way of determining what a hypothetical "reasonable legislature" might do, there is
no predicate for finding recklessness or negligence.
90. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981), is an example of a case where a reckless-
ness standard would almost certainly have resulted in liability for the defendant. Acting on complaints
by residents of an all-white enclave and despite opposing petitions by black citizens, id. at 143 n.9
(Marshall, J., dissenting), the City closed a street frequently used by blacks which passed through the
white neighborhood. The Supreme Court, in upholding the City's decision in the face of Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendment challenges (1) refused to examine the motives of the white citizens who
had requested the closing, looking instead only at the City's purpose, id. at 114 & n.23, which obvi-
ously was to satisfy the desires of the petitioning citizens; and (2) refused to give any weight to the
fact that Memphis had segregated its public facilities as late as 1963, id. at 116 n.27.
Taken in isolation, as the Court chose to take it, the City's decision might simply have been a case
where one group's interests trumped another group's competing interests. Taken in the context of
Memphis' history of official segregation, however, the City's action reflected its persistent undervalua-
tion of black interests.
91. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (explaining Title VII's effects test).
92. See Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163, 1164-65
(1978) (contrasting purpose requirement with effects test; former involves condemnatory aspect absent
from latter); cf Nagle, How the Right Learned to Love Earl Warren, WAsH. MONTHLY, Oct. 1982,
50, 53 (current constitutional doctrine involves disparagement of good faith of government officials).
93. See supra pp. 113-14.
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past purposeful and intolerable exclusion and to prevent such injuries
from happening in the future.9' The standard which equal protection law
employs should reflect these moral considerations.
Of course, equal protection law might adopt a modified effects test in
which a defendant could vindicate its disproportionately burdensome acts
by pointing to some alternative justification.95 Such a modified effects test,
however, would be little more than a requirement that acts with disparate
effects be subjected to heightened scrutiny. Under such a test, a defendant
would be able to justify its acts if it could show that they served some
"compelling" or "important" state interest. It thus would contribute noth-
ing more than an intent requirement;9" moreover, it would lack the Four-
teenth Amendment's moral condemnation of discrimination, something
which an intent requirement provides. Developing a broad conception of
discriminatory intent as proposed in this Note better serves the goals of
the equal protection clause.
An intent standard has another advantage over an effects test. Without
conceding that there are nonculpable state motivations for differentiating
among beneficiaries by race, there can be no principled justification for
affirmative action.97 A strictly construed effects test would prohibit actions
designed to aid those groups whose plight originally prompted modem
antidiscrimination law." An intent standard, by recognizing that there
94. A strict effects test, in which proof of any disproportionate impact would invalidate a law,
would destroy the legislature's balancing function, since such a test would require the state always to
value the interests of protected groups more highly than the interests of other persons, no matter how
insignificant the former or how substantial the latter.
If the Court's analysis in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 n.14 (1976), is correct, an effects
test might be used to invalidate even such seemingly innocuous governmental actions as uniform sales
taxes or bridge tolls, despite their obvious administrative advantages and the fairly insignificant bur-
dens they normally place on minorities. Furthermore, continuing such practices would not be justified
by the possibly tremendous costs that might be involved in developing alternatives that do not dispro-
portionately disadvantage minorities.
95. The effects test employed in Title VII cases, for example, permits disproportionate impacts
caused by job-related practices. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,331-32 (1977) (proof of job-
relatedness would save regulations that disproportionately exclude women from prison guard posi-
tions); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (business necessity is "touchstone" in
deciding whether to permit disproportionately burdensome practices); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1)
(1976) (allowing discrimination based on gender, religion, or national origin when any of these is a
bona fide occupational qualification-e.g., permitting hiring only men to be sperm donors).
96. The defendant's opportunity under such a modified effects test to put forward a "legislative
necessity" explanation for disproportionately burdensome acts would parallel its opportunity under an
intent standard to save its intentionally discriminatory acts by showing that they met the burden
imposed by strict or intermediate scrutiny. See infra pp. 128-29 (discussion of heightened scrutiny
triggered by showing of intent).
97. The justification for a principle that allows race-conscious affirmative action must rest on
past, purposeful discrimination against blacks (or any other protected group). See Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 396 (1978) (Marshall, J.) (past pervasive discrimination makes bringing
blacks into economic and professional mainstream "a state interest of the highest order").
98. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (rejecting argument that equal protection
clause prohibits minority set-aside program); supra note 76.
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can be compelling reasons for sometimes preferring race- or gender-based
groups,99 and by granting the legislature authority to take actions to rem-
edy these groups' disadvantaged positions, 00 more nearly fulfills the aims
of the antidiscrimination principle.
IV. WRONGFUL INTENT AND JUSTIFICATION
In criminal law, proof of an actus reus and a mens rea usually suffices
to establish criminal liability.101 The principal qualifications to this gen-
eral rule are various defenses which enable a defendant to argue that,
although he had the culpable mens rea, his act was nonetheless not blame-
worthy because of countervailing circumstances.1 0 2
In addition to this separate, justificatory stage, criminal law addresses
the question of justifiability in its definitions of recklessness and negli-
gence. Determining either involves a two-step process. First, actual or
constructive awareness of a substantial risk must be proved. Second, the
defendant's conscious purpose must be shown to be inadequate to justify
acting despite the risk.'08 Equal protection law also affords defendants the
opportunity to justify their conduct.
A. Discriminatory Intent and Heightened Scrutiny
In current equal protection litigation, neither proof of a racial or gen-
der-based classification nor proof of a discriminatory purpose and dispa-
rate effect leads automatically to a finding of unconstitutionality. Instead,
proof of an explicitly discriminatory classification triggers the reviewing
court's use of a more exacting form of scrutiny to determine whether the
burden imposed is justified by some other legislative purpose.'0 4 When a
99. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-08 (1979) (upholding voluntary affirm-
ative action plan in traditionally segregated craft union against Title VII claim); O'Neil, Preferential
Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699,
718-41 (1971) (arguing for affirmative action in college admissions); cf. Ely, The Constitutionality of
Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 723, 730-31, 735 (1974) (prejudice against mi-
norities triggers heightened scrutiny; such prejudice is absent from affirmative action cases, and dis-
tinctions are therefore not wrongful).
100. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472-84 (1980) (explicitly basing approval of mi-
nority set-aside program on Congress's broad power to remedy past discrimination); Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387 (1978) (Marshall, J.) (when state acts to remedy effects of past
discrimination, Constitution cannot stand as barrier).
101. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.01-2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (requirement of vol-
untary act and culpable state of mind).
102. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05(2) (Consol. 1977) (justification defenses involve avoidance of
result more serious than that which statute violated seeks to prevent); MODEL PENAL CODE, supra
note 58, art. 3 (same); see also S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, supra note 10, at 496-555 (materials on
exculpatory and justificatory defenses); G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART §§
173-80 (1953) (discussion of necessity defense).
103. See Fletcher, supra note 62, at 430; supra notes 60-61.
104. See supra p. 116.
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plaintiff proves discriminatory intent and disparate effect, the defendant's
opportunity to rebut the Arlington Heights presumption serves a similar
justificatory function: If the defendant can show that it would have acted
as it did even absent the desire to injure blacks or women-presumably
because there were sufficient legitimate reasons for its action-the chal-
lenged measure will be upheld.1" 5
Current equal protection doctrine assesses purpose without considering
whether purposeful discrimination against the protected group is justi-
fied.106 Because showing both foreseeability and unjustifiability before em-
ploying heightened scrutiny would be redundant in ascertaining reckless-
ness or negligence, 10 7 actual or constructive foreseeability of a substantial
risk of injury to minorities should by itself trigger the demand for
justification.10 '
B. Justification and Judicial Balancing
At the intent-determining stage, this Note's approach would involve lit-
tle judicial balancing, since courts are asked only to ascertain the foresee-
105. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21
(1977). It is unclear whether there is any effective difference between the scrutiny given explicit
classifications and the scrutiny given facially neutral but intentionally discriminatory classifications.
See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring). A similar ques-
tion has arisen in Title VII cases. See Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2535 (1982) (Title VII
prohibits two distinctive violations: disparate treatment and disparate impact).
106. There is a disturbing circularity to the current method of assessing intent. Until the plaintiff
proves either that a facially neutral measure in fact involves a race- or gender-based distinction or that
a desire to disadvantage blacks or women motivated the adoption of a facially neutral law, see Person-
nel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979), courts will apply rational relationship scrutiny. As
long as such low-level review is made, the fit between the articulated purpose and the challenged goal
need not be particularly tight. The court, therefore, will not credit the plaintiffs' claims of legislative
animus, as long as the defendant is able to articulate a plausible basis for its act. In Feeney, for
example, as long as the Court was willing to assume a rational relationship, however tenuous, be-
tween an absolute lifetime veterans' preference and the goals of easing veterans' transitions into civil-
ian life and encouraging service to one's country (and the Court's opinion pointed to no evidence to
support either relationship), it would never find any discriminatory animus against women. Only
when the court employs a more exacting fit standard, which it will do only once it has already deter-
mined the presence of discriminatory intent, will it find impermissible legislative intent.
107. If an act had foreseeable, unjustifiable consequences for minorities, then the state would not
be able to argue at the scrutiny stage that those effects already found to have been unjustifiable in
light of the state's purpose were justifiable in light of that same purpose.
108. In some kinds of equal protection cases, proving negligence may be impossible. As a theoreti-
cal matter, certain types of claims require showing a more seriously culpable state of mind. For
example, in a jury selection case, the fact that a particular panel has no black members because an
absolutely random selection process resulted in a monochromatic jury is indeed a sign that the system
is working correctly. See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S 282, 291 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (no
equal protection violation if exclusion due to "uncontrolled caprices of chance"). If, however, a plain-
tiff proved that no blacks were on a particular panel because of purposeful discrimination by the
state-leaving aside the thorny question of the prosecution's use of its peremptory challenges to inten-
tionally strike minority jurors, see People v. McCray, 103 S.Ct. 2438, 2438-39 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari); id. at 2439-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
Swain'v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221 (1965)-then the system used or the conviction obtained should
be thrown out.
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ability of a substantial risk of injury to a protected group. At the liability-
determining stage, the courts' proper focus broadens somewhat to take ac-
count of concerns other than avoiding injury to victims.
The presence of some judicial balancing should not be troublesome for
two reasons. First, only by allowing such balancing can constitutional law
accommodate its competing goals of condemning morally offensive dis-
crimination and protecting legitimate legislative activity."' Second, the
discretion of lower courts will, over time, come to be controlled by the
accretion of precedent.110 Certain state aims will come to be viewed as
sufficiently important to justify some foreseeable impact, while others will
not.
111
C. The Effects on the Justificatory Stage of Broadening the Intent
Standard
One result of increasing the number of cases in which heightened scru-
tiny is employed may be to dilute slightly the strictness of such scrutiny.'
Such a result should not dissuade courts from applying slightly less
heightened scrutiny to intentionally discriminatory state action if this
Note's conception of discriminatory intent is adopted.
First, the stringency of the current standard is due in large part to its
development as a response to explicit racial distinctions designed to disad-
vantage blacks. 1" By hypothesis, however, knowing, reckless, and negli-
109. Without some balancing, even a de minimis foreseeable effect could not justify pursuit of
even the most compelling state goal. See supra note 94.
The alternative would be to allow every legislative determination to survive judicial scrutiny regard-
less of how purposeful its injury of protected minorities. Such a course would essentially write the
Fourteenth Amendment out of the Constitution. Nor would enacting a per se rule against racial
classifications solve this problem. First, the state would still be able to engage in "means discrimina-
tion," by picking an umbrella goal and carefully writing its legislation so that the class burdened or
excluded was roughly identical to blacks or women. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341
(1960) (complicated redrawing of town boundary disenfranchised all but four or five of 400 black
voters). Second, such a rule would also make affirmative action impossible. See supra pp. 127-28.
110. This accretion of precedent and the constraints imposed by a hierarchical judicial system are
essential to control of judicial discretion. See E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 6-7
(1949); K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 56-69 (2d ed. 1951).
111. The Court has developed such a clarification of permissible and impermissible goals to ana-
lyze explicit gender-based discrimination. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464,
470-73 (1981) (prevention of teenage pregnancy justifies gender-based statutory rape law); Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-91 (1977) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (additional ease in ad-
ministering program does not justify gender-based proof of dependency requirements).
112. In other words, there may be cases in which a substantial disproportionate impact was (or
should have been) foreseeable, and the defendant was thus acting intentionally, but the act was never-
theless justified because of the purpose that motivated it. Strict scrutiny will therefore no longer be
"strict in theory but [always] fatal in fact." Gunther, supra note 28, at 8; see Note, A Madisonian
Interpretation of the Equal Protection Doctrine, 91 YALE L.J. 1403, 1416-17 (1982) (value of "rheto-
ric of absolutes" in constitutional law).
113. See Schnapper, supra note 15, at 45 (inadequacy of Court's holding in Feeney due to fact
that tools used to assess intent were developed in era when Court reviewed obvious discrimination).
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gent acts do not have such disadvantaging as their purpose. A state inter-
est that is not compelling enough to justify a disparate impact on minori-
ties and the stigmatic harm of state-enforced racial distinctions, 1 4 might
be important enough to justify a disparate impact absent such stigmatic
injury.'15
Second, the strictness of current strict scrutiny seems in large part re-
sponsible for the Supreme Court's artificial restriction of the concept of
discriminatory intent."' The middle course this Note proposes trades
some of the rhetorical value of current heightened scrutiny for
nonperfunctory judicial review of significantly more state action having
the effect of perpetuating blacks' disadvantaged status.
V. REMEDIAL IMPLICATIONS OF A BROADER DEFINITION OF
DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
The most significant differences between criminal and constitutional
law lie in how they treat violators after liability is established and how
that treatment affects third parties.11 The remedial stage of an equal pro-
tection case provides the proper opportunity to consider the interests of
third parties.
A. Considering Third-Party Interests at the Remedial Stage
The flexibility of equitable remedies 8 affords the most appropriate op-
portunity for considering the claims of third parties. The intent- and
114. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (state segregation of black school
children "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone"); Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 3, at
116 & n.109 (very act of adopting racial distinctions is insult to minorities).
Under the scheme proposed by this Note, as in current doctrine, an invidious racial classification
would virtually never pass muster. Rather, the result is likely to be that some foreseeably burdensome
acts will be upheld. Their number will certainly be fewer than is currently the case, however, since
the present intent standard permits all neutral acts to survive in spite of their adverse consequences.
115. For example, in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Court might well have
upheld the challenged examination on the theory that, although it had a foreseeable disparate impact,
it was the best test of the qualities required to achieve the indisputably important state interest in a
competent police force. In reaching such a decision, the reviewing court should take into account the
defendant's efforts to ameliorate the disparate impact by extensive minority recruiting or coaching, as
the Washington v. Davis court implicitly did, id. at 235.
At the same time, a court should conclude that explicitly banning blacks from the department
because blacks were on average less qualified than whites would not be justified by even a fairly
significant increase in police efficiency, either because such a decision would impermissibly stigmatize
blacks or because the predictive value of race rests in large part on past impermissible state discrimi-
nation. See Underwood, Lau' and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and
Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1434-36 (1979) (explaining hostility to use of race as
predictive factor).
116. The Supreme Court, faced with what it wrongly perceived as a choice between finding all
foresecably discriminatory acts intentional and thus overturning the laws wholesale, or adhering to a
purpose standard and never overturning such acts, chose the latter course. See supra p. 123.
117. See supra pp. 118-19.
118. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) ("Traditionally, equity has been charac-
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liability-determining stages of an equal protection case concern solely the
defendant's attitudes toward the plaintiff class, although the defendant's
attitude towards third parties may provide some basis for comparison. " 9
At the remedial stage a court can explicitly consider other social inter-
ests.1 0 Explicitly making such determinations would make the develop-
ment of standards through appellate review far easier than is currently
possible: Because findings of intent are findings of fact, 21 the present sys-
tem does its balancing at the intent-determining stage and severely con-
strains appellate review.
In addition, although explicit balancing at the remedial stage makes
manifest the existence of a right-remedy gap, 22 acknowledging that gap
can provide an impetus for non-judicial actors to pursue greater remedia-
tion for victims than courts provide."12 Moreover, the dignitary interests of
victims of intentionally discriminatory conduct are better served by con-
demnation of governmental carelessness than they are by the current defi-
nition of discriminatory animus, which always allows judicial actors to
claim that they fully cure all equal protection violations."
B. A Spectrum of Discriminatory Intent and the Remedial Enterprise
The touchstone of equitable relief is that "the nature of the violation
determines the scope of the remedy.1125 The nature of an equal protection
terized by a practical flexibility in its shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and recon-
ciling public and private needs.") (citation omitted).
119. Regardless of the other concerns a defendant is seeking to serve, its foreseeably discrimina-
tory act reflects an intent to place a burden on the plaintiffs which it might have placed on a different
group or on no one at all.
120. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977) (in formulating equitable decrees,
courts should look at interests other than plaintiffs'); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (equitable decree requires "balancing . . . of individual and collective inter-
ests"); Note, Institutional Reform Litigation: Representation in the Remedial Process, 91 YALE L.J.
1474, 1484-88 (1982) (proposing joinder of third parties at remedial stage).
121. Pullman-Standard, Inc. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 285-90 & n.16 (1982) (discriminatory intent
is "pure" finding of fact governed by "dearly erroneous" standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
122. A right-remedy gap occurs when a court is either unable or unwilling to provide the victims
of a constitutional violation with a remedy that will vindicate their rights. See Gewirtz, supra note 8,
at 655-74.
123. See S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-39 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws, 177, 192-217 (effectively overruling Court's imposition of intent requirement in
Voting Rights Act cases); Gewirtz, supra note 8, at 672-73 (maintenance of principle in face of right-
remedy gap lends moral authority to those who seek to vindicate it more fully). As Alexander Bickel
noted, "The effectiveness of principle is not less because we are allowed to admit that we do not live
up to it when we don't." A. BICKEL, supra note 7, at 96.
124. See Fiss, supra note 8, at 54-55 (courts' desire not to appear impotent leads them to tailor
rights so they can claim to be providing full relief).
125. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). But see Fiss, supra
note 8, at 47-48 (object of remedy should be to eliminate threat to constitutional values; violation
simply triggers courts' remedial powers).
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violation depends upon its disproportionate impact and the dignitary in-
sult inherent in the state's having acted to cause such an impact.126
Under current equal protection doctrine, the scope of a violation varies
solely in terms of its effects, since the intent involved-purpose-remains
constant across all violations.12 7 If less culpable states of mind were to
meet the intent requirement, as this Note proposes, then the scope of the
violation would also vary with the degree of discriminatory intent
proved. 2 As the Court recognized last Term in Guardians Association v.
Civil Service Commission, " "[ilt is not uncommon in the law for the ex-
tent of a defendant's liability to turn on the extent of his knowledge or his
culpability,"1 0 and therefore for the remedy a victim of discrimination
receives to depend on the violator's state of mind. If the determination of a
remedial decree depends on balancing two quantities-the victims' inter-
ests and the legitimate concerns of third parties-the decree will thus be
affected by the magnitude of the violation of the victims' rights: As the
scope of a violation narrows, the relative weight of third party interests
will increase.1"
126. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (state's exclusion of blacks from
juries "practically a brand [of inferiority] upon them"); Brest, Antidiscrimination Principle, supra
note 3, at 8-11 (stigmatic harm of intentional discrimination); supra note 114. This understanding of
the scope of the violation underlies the intuition that de jure segregation is more harmful than de facto
segregation; the insult of the state's having isolated blacks adds to the effects of that isolation.
127. Without some effect, no one would have standing to challenge a legislature's allegedly dis-
criminatory measure. Such standing, however, need not rest on more than a de minimis actual effect,
because the insult inherent in discriminatory conduct exacerbates that disparate impact. See Ely,
supra note 6, at 1252 n.139.
128. A purposeful violation would be more serious than a negligent violation even if both had the
same effect. An analogy from criminal law might prove helpful here. All homicides have the same
material effect-a dead body. Nevertheless, we believe purposeful homicide to be more blameworthy
than reckless homicide, and we punish murder more severely than we punish manslaughter.
129. 103 S.Ct. 3221 (1983).
130. Id. at 3230 n.20 (White, J.). Guardians held that a private plaintiff in a Title VI suit could
obtain prospective relief simply by showing discriminatory effect, but was barred from obtaining ret-
rospective relief unless discriminatory intent were proved as well.
131. Some interests that cannot trump curing purposefully discriminatory violations might out-
weigh providing full or partial relief to victims of negligently discriminatory conduct. See supra note
115; ef. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 80-83 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (agreeing
with dissenters that purposeful discrimination had been shown, but concurring in rejection of district
court remedial decree because remedy was too sweeping).
There are a vast array of potential remedial tools from which courts can choose, depending on the
type of violation shown. For example, they can make their decrees prospective or retroactive, order
backpay, establish numerical guidelines, and order a variety of forms of direct compensation for mem-
bers of a class who can prove actual injury. In addition, a court faced with a purposefully discrimina-
tory defendant might order a more specific remedial decree than it would otherwise formulate in order
to minimize the defendant's chances for successful evasion of its remedial obligations. See, e.g., City of
Port Arthur v. United States, 103 S.Ct. 530 (1982) (prophylactic voting rule to prevent future depri-
vation); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 283-86 (1977) (approving special remedial programs for
victims of school segregation); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211, 1218
(5th Cir. 1969) (en banc) (specifying number of black teachers to be assigned to each school), rev'd on
other grounds, 396 U.S. 290 (1970); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 388 F. Supp. 581, 583 (D. Mass. 1975)
(ordering hiring of black teachers until percentage in school system approximated representation in
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Here too, then, this Note's suggestion will result in an overt right-
remedy gap: Not all the effects of discriminatory acts will be cured, de-
spite the compensatory thrust of antidiscrimination law. This gap, how-
ever, is the result of an expansion of the right, through a more compre-
hensive understanding of discriminatory intent.1"' Ultimately, candor
about remedial imperfection reflects greater judicial integrity than does
the current disingenuous definition of discriminatory intent.133
-Pamela S. Karlan
population), affd, 530 F.2d 431 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976).
132. In general, right-remedy gaps are caused by courts' contracting the available remedies for a
violation. See Freeman, Legitimating Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1102-19 (1978); Gewirtz,
supra note 8, at 655-74.
133. Although Calabresi argues that subterfuges are sometimes necessary to conceal from a society
its inability to adhere to its principles, see G. CALABRESI & P. BoBrrr, TRAGIC CHOIcES 17-28
(1978), Gewirtz persuasively argues for judicial candor in the face of a right-remedy gap. In addition
to such honesty providing other actors with moral authority and the impetus to seek a fuller realiza-
tion of the right than the courts are able or willing to provide, see supra note 123, candor protects the
right against insidious encroachment:
[S]ubterfuge carries a serious risk that the boundaries of any compromise of victim rights will
be blurred. Candor helps to prevent slippage-that is, judicial action that ends up allowing a
gap between right and remedy beyond what is justified and beyond what was initially thought
reasonable. By requiring everyone to face up to the remedial compromise, candor facilitates the
limitation and control of compromise.
Gewirtz, supra note 8, at 670. The Supreme Court, by hiding its compromises of blacks' and women's
rights to have their interests fairly weighed, has allowed a far wider gulf to develop between rights
and remedies than a more honest definition of intent would have engendered.
